Fractal Poverty Traps by Barrett, Christopher B. & Swallow, Brent M.
WP 2003-42 
September 2003 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
Department of Applied Economics and Management 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853-7801 USA 
 
 
 
Fractal Poverty Traps 
 
 
 
Christopher B. Barrett  
Department of Applied Economics and Management 
Cornell University 
 
and 
 
Brent M. Swallow 
World Agroforestry Centre 
 
 
 
 
It is the Policy of Cornell University actively to support equality of educational 
and employment opportunity.  No person shall be denied admission to any 
educational program or activity or be denied employment on the basis of any 
legally prohibited discrimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as 
race, color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or handicap.  
The University is committed to the maintenance of affirmative action 
programs which will assure the continuation of such equality of opportunity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fractal Poverty Traps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christopher B. Barrett 
Department of Applied Economics and Management 
315 Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7801  USA 
cbb2@cornell.edu 
 
and 
 
Brent M. Swallow 
World Agroforestry Centre 
P.O. Box 30677, Nairobi, Kenya 
B.Swallow@cgiar.org 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2003 revision (v. 1.0) 
Comments greatly appreciated 
 
 
 
We thank Larry Blume, Doug Brown, Michael Carter, Alain de Janvry, Andrew Mude, Ben 
Okumu and Frank Place and participants at the January 2003 ICRISAT/DFID conference on 
“Rural Livelihoods and Poverty Reduction Policies” for helpful discussions.  This work was 
made possible in part by grants from the United States Agency for International Development, 
number LAG-A-00-96-90016-00 through the BASIS CRSP managed at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, and through the Strategies and Analyses for Growth with Access 
cooperative agreement at Cornell University.  All views, interpretations, recommendations, and 
conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the 
supporting or cooperating organizations. 
 
 
 Copyright 2003 by Christopher B. Barrett and Brent Swallow.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for 
non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
 1
Fractal Poverty Traps 
 
 
Abstract:  This paper offers an informal theory of fractal poverty traps that lead to 
chronic poverty at multiple scales of socio-spatial aggregation.  Poverty 
traps result from nonlinear processes at individual, household, community, 
national and international scales that cause the coexistence of high and low 
equilibrium levels of productivity and income and high and low rates of 
economic growth.  Multiple equilibria result from key threshold effects 
that exist at all scales due to market failures and nonmarket coordination 
problems.  Key implications of fractal poverty traps include (i) the 
importance of recognizing meso-level phenomena in addition to 
conventional micro- and macro-level issues, (ii) inter-connections across 
social-spatial scales that foster or ameliorate chronic poverty,  (iii) the 
importance of identifying and overcoming thresholds at which 
accumulation and productivity dynamics bifurcate, and (iv) the significant 
potential role of transitory donor and government interventions and safety 
nets to ignite sustainable growth among the poor.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
At least one-fifth of the world’s population suffers extreme poverty, living on less 
than $1/day.  In Sub-Saharan Africa alone, the share of total population living in 
extreme poverty has remained stuck at between 45 and 50 percent for the past fifteen 
years, with population growth bringing the total number of extreme poor in Africa to 
more than 290 million people.1  Although extreme poverty is most widespread in 
Africa as a share of population, it has likewise stabilized as a share of population in 
Latin America, while Asia’s vastly larger population translates into nearly three times 
as many people in extreme poverty on that continent.  Increasing the incomes of the 
more than 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty by $1/day per person would 
require an extra $450 billion per year in direct income gains to these poor people, not 
counting associated income gains to others.  Such a staggering figure suggests a need 
for strategic focus and the necessity of igniting sustained growth among the poor, not 
just aiming for one-off gains.  This requires a clear conceptualization of the nature 
and causality of poverty.  This paper offers a contribution toward meeting that need.  
                                                 
1 This and other poverty statistics in this paragraph come from the World Bank’s Global Poverty 
Monitoring system on the web at http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/. 
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We focus on two key aspects of the nature of poverty2.  The first concerns its 
dynamics: how human well-being evolves over time.  We know that much poverty is 
transitory.3  People commonly suffer – or even choose – short-term income losses that 
push them below an inherently arbitrary poverty line for a relatively brief period of 
time.  Then they recover without explicit external assistance.  While even transitory 
poverty is plainly undesirable, the capacity of the transitorily poor to rebound quickly 
from downward shocks typically causes policymakers and scholars to focus more 
attention on those  who remain poor for more extended periods of time.  Attention is 
therefore focusing more than ever on “chronic” or “persistent” poverty.4   
Consider a crude comparison of poverty dynamics in Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
South Africa and the United States, based on four separate studies (Figure 1).5  The 
leftmost point on each country series in Figure 1 reflects the headcount poverty 
measure at one point in time, as measured against the US dollar/day per person 
poverty line noted in parentheses.  The subsequent points depict the percentage of the 
population that was poor in both the initial period and the subsequent survey 
period(s). This graphic captures the crucial distinction between persistent and 
transitory poverty. If all poverty were chronic, the lines would all be horizontal, as 
those who were poor in the initial survey period would always remain poor. 
Conversely, if all poverty were transitory, the lines would collapse to the x axis quite 
rapidly.  
Several key hypotheses jump out of a graphic such as this.  First, international 
differences in headcount poverty measures appear noticeably less than the differences 
in persistent poverty measures at horizons of a year or more.  For example, although 
in 1993, one headcount measure of poverty in the United States reached 22.3 percent, 
less than one quarter of those households remained poor one year later, and only 5.3 
                                                 
2 Poverty is a multi-dimensional phenonema encompassing low income or consumption, high 
vulnerability to shocks, and lack of voice or power.  In the interests of brevity,  in this introductory 
section we rely on the standard income and expenditure poverty conceptualization.  But as should 
become apparent as the paper progresses, our theory of fractal poverty traps aims explicitly at linking 
the standard economic view of consumption or income poverty with the concepts of vulnerability and 
voicelessness, especially as all three are linked through asset holdings and mechanisms of production 
and exchange.  
3 See in particular Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) and the various studies cited there. 
4 For example, the recent special issue of World Development edited by Hulme and Shepherd (2003). 
5 We must emphasize the crudeness of these comparisons.  The welfare measures and poverty lines 
were not constructed in precisely the same way across the different countries nor are the South Africa 
or Ethiopia data from nationally representative samples.  We are merely drawing on others’ published 
results to make a basic qualitative point.  We recommend against making any specific, quantitative 
inferences off comparisons between these imperfectly comparable series. 
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percent of the American population was poor for two years continuously, with a 
median time in poverty of merely 4.5 months (Naifeh 1998).  With the exception of 
Ethiopia – where the data reflect semi-annual measures using an extremely low 
poverty line of $0.23 per person per day and thus reflect high rates of churning only 
around a level of extreme deprivation – none of the other countries plotted exhibit 
such a drop off in household poverty over time.  Although the United States suffers a 
high headcount rate of poverty – albeit, measured against a relatively high poverty 
line equivalent to $15.05 per person per day for a family of four, more than 65 times 
the Ethiopia poverty line used here – most poverty in the United States is transitory 
and the percentage of the population that is persistently poor is relatively small.  
Second, most of the poor in the African cases appear to be persistently poor.  
In Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia, 85 and 52 percent, respectively, of the poor remained 
poor one year later, while in South Africa 66 percent of the poor remained poor five 
years later. Although these comparisons are necessarily crude, they nonetheless 
underscore an important qualitative point: it is not just the magnitude of poverty but, 
perhaps even more and more importantly, the nature and duration of poverty that 
differentiates much of the developing world from the United States and other wealthy 
countries.  Where anti-poverty policy in the wealthy countries largely revolves around 
the provision of safety nets to cushion people against short-term shocks and to help 
them “get back on their feet again” quickly, in the developing countries the task is 
necessarily far more challenging.   The persistent poverty of developing countries is 
of grave concern  not only because of the severe material deprivation it represents, but 
equally because of the hopelessness that such dim prospects can induce, with severe 
cultural, moral and political implications. 
Such observations give particular salience to the concept of poverty traps into 
which people may fall and have some difficulty escaping.  The basic idea of poverty 
traps turns on the existence of multiple dynamic equilibria, as posited by Allyn 
Young, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Gunnar Myrdal and other classic development 
theorists of the early and mid-20th century.  The dynamics of convergence toward one 
or another equilibrium depends on where one sits initially relative to critical 
thresholds at which the path dynamics of income growth and asset accumulation 
bifurcate.  People, communities and entire nations or multinational regions have a 
difficult time rising beyond such thresholds without assistance, and can unexpectedly 
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fall below them.6  These thresholds reflect a bifurcation point in the expected 
dynamics of movement toward stable dynamic equilibria, with at least one 
equilibrium reflecting a poor standard of living. Absent such thresholds, all poverty 
would be transitory with everyone converging toward a single equilibrium income 
level, as posited by neoclassical economic growth theory (Solow 1956).  
Overwhelming empirical evidence against such unconditional convergence has 
motivated a flurry of research over the past twenty years on “new” or “nonergodic” 
theories of economic growth at the macroeconomic level and on the microfoundations 
of poverty traps.7   
The causality behind the poverty trap phenomenon nonetheless remains 
murky.  Different analysts from different disciplinary traditions, studying different 
regions, find different correlates of persistent poverty and posit different causal 
mechanisms.  The gaps remain considerable between the theory and the empirics and 
between different disciplines’ analyses of the phenomenon of chronic poverty.  One 
reason (among many) is the difficulty of integrating findings from distinctly different 
scales of analysis. Most of the economics research on poverty is either at the very 
micro scale of individuals and households or at the macro scale of nation states and 
regions, while much of the corresponding literature in anthropology, geography, 
sociology, and political science concentrates on intermediate scales of villages, ethnic 
groups, ecoregions and political jurisdictions.  
This leads directly to the second key aspect of the nature of poverty on which 
we focus: its multi-scalar nature. Our theory emphasizes the existence of a basic 
pattern that repeats itself at multiple scales of social-spatial aggregation.  We 
therefore refer to this multi-scalar view of persistent poverty as a theory of fractal 
poverty traps, drawing on the fractal geometric concept of self-similarity with 
independence of scale.8  The modifier “fractal” reflects our observation that there 
exists a pattern to poverty traps that repeats itself at all scales of aggregation, from the 
most micro-scale of individuals to macro-scale of nation states and multinational 
regions and through important intermediate, or “meso” scales.  As we will explain in 
the remainder of the paper, the concept of fractal poverty traps implies a need (i) to 
                                                 
6 The fall is necessarily unexpected – we will later refer to them as “shocks” – for if one could 
anticipate a shock severe enough to push one past such a threshold, one would avert it if at all possible. 
7 Easterly (2001) offers an especially accessible, even entertaining treatment of the evolution of growth 
theory and the empirical evidence on economic growth.  After we began this paper, we discovered that 
he too uses the term “fractal poverty traps,” although his use of the term is purely descriptive.  
8 See Mandelbrot (1977, 1983) for the seminal contributions to fractal geometry.   
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broaden poverty analysis beyond the familiar micro-macro dichotomy prevalent in 
economics so as to take intermediate scales of aggregation seriously, (ii) to address 
appropriate roles for subnational scale institutions in poverty reduction strategies,9 
and (iii) to consider how investments at any particular scale  are shaped not only by 
the direct returns associated with asset accumulation or productivity growth at that 
scale, but also by prospective indirect effects resulting from how investment at one 
scale might affect thresholds, and patterns of asset accumulation or productivity 
growth  at other scales.  We begin by developing a model of poverty traps that centers 
on thresholds in the returns to assets and the dynamics of asset accumulation. 
 
2. The causes of poverty traps: An informal theory 
 
The theoretical economics literature on poverty traps works from the familiar 
microeconomic foundation of individual resource allocation to generate multiple 
equilibria through either (i) increasing returns to scale technologies, often due to 
externalities at the societal scale (Romer 1986, Lucas 1988, Azariadis and Drazen 
1990, Durlauf 1996), (ii) spatial agglomeration economies and resulting market and 
technological effects at regional scale (Krugman 1991, Fujita et al. 1999), and 
financial markets failures combined with either (iii) indivisibilities in key 
investments, such as education or livestock (Loury 1981, Banerjee and Newman 
1993, Galor and Zeira 1993, Dercon 1998, Mookherjee and Ray 2002) or (iv) 
irreversibilities due to subsistence thresholds (Zimmerman and Carter 2003).  The 
parallel, multidisciplinary development literature on rural livelihoods and technology 
adoption emphasizes the role of social networks and collective action, and 
appropriately shifts attention away from the sectoral focus of most economic models 
to the multisectoral behaviours of individuals and groups (Reardon and Vosti 1995, 
Rogers 1995, Davies 1996, Bryceson and Jamal 1997, Scoones 1998, Ellis 2000, 
Barrett, Place and Aboud 2002).   These two approaches remain largely unintegrated 
despite inherent complementarities on which we explicitly build in this paper.  Both 
                                                 
9  A focus on the distinct roles of meso-scale institutions distinguishes this paper from much of the U.S. 
based literature on fiscal federalism as well as the more recent literature on decentralized governance in 
transition and developing countries.  The fiscal federalism literature concentrates on efficient 
production and allocation of public services to households and firms with different preferences (see 
Oates (1999) for an excellent recent review). By contrast, the newer literature on decentralized 
governance in developing countries focuses on issues such as accountability, regional disparities, 
leakage, and capture by elites (e.g., Bardhan 2002).    
 6
traditions seek to shed light on the etiology of persistent low productivity, investment, 
and standards of living, while emphasizing the role of assets and accumulation 
patterns. This section draws on key insights from each literature to advance a theory 
of fractal poverty traps.   
 
a. The static model 
The fundamental choices around which we construct the theory of fractal 
poverty traps are strategies.  At the micro scale of individuals and households, and 
especially in the multidisciplinary literature on rural development, the current 
terminology refers to livelihood strategies, reflecting the diverse activities in which 
poor households typically engage (Scoones 1998, Ellis 2000, Hulme and Shepherd 
2003).  However, the modifier livelihood is less appropriate at more aggregate scales, 
where collective choice is reflected in development strategies that nest within them 
individual and household scale livelihood strategies.  The more general, scale-
independent concept, therefore, relates to strategies, defined as a set of activities 
undertaken by (individual or collective) decision-makers using available assets to 
shape current and future standards of living.   
One of the weaknesses of most of the economic growth theory literature is the 
pervasive assumption of a unique production technology or uniform participation (or 
nonpartcipation) in markets, equivalent here to a single strategy.  This assumed 
homogeneity defies the empirical regularity that within any collective unit, one tends 
to observe a range of different activities chosen by different constituent agents, with 
differing levels of productivity.  Our conception of poverty traps explicitly seeks to  
incorporate and explain the multiplicity of strategies available and chosen at each 
scale of aggregation.   
Choices among strategies depend on the opportunities available to and the 
constraints faced by decision-makers and the relative returns to each strategy.10  Each 
strategy maps a stock of productive assets – roughly speaking, financial, human, 
natural, physical and social capital – into income and other flows of value via a 
transformation function.  The shape of the transformation function depends on the 
underlying production and exchange mechanisms – production technologies, 
organizational forms, market and nonmarket resource allocation arrangements – that 
                                                 
10 These returns may be multidimensional, reflecting income, risk, prestige, and other distinct factors of 
intrinsic value to individual decision-makers. 
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define each strategy and its productivity, given exogenous determinants of production 
and exchange (e.g., rainfall and other biophysical phenomena, local institutional 
history, exogenous market prices), as well as the risks associated with prices, yields, 
and assets.  We take it as self-evident that decision-makers choose the strategy that 
best provides for their current and future needs and wants, given their individual 
circumstances.  In economic terms, decision-makers opt for the strategy that 
maximizes their discounted stream of current and future utility.  Strategy choice 
reveals agents’ preferences among the feasible options they face. 
Human welfare – including poverty – thereby turns on the strategic options 
available to people and on the productivity of those strategies.  The set of feasible 
strategies depends, in turn, on the stock of productive assets they control: their 
endowments of financial, human, natural, physical and social capital.  Some strategies 
are effectively open to any decision-maker.  At the scales of households or 
individuals, for example, exclusive reliance on unskilled labor markets is almost 
universally feasible.  Entry barriers commonly restrict access to other strategies that 
offer expected returns superior to those generated by such universally accessible 
strategies. Among desirable strategies, the higher the entry barrier, the higher the 
expected returns to the activity for those who can surmount the barrier, else the 
strategy would never be optimal and thus would never be chosen.   
This basic conceptualization can be depicted in a simple diagram of strategic 
options that map one’s initial stock of productive assets into resulting expected utility, 
productivity or income levels (i.e., the argument of the objective function one 
assumes the decision-maker to be optimizing).  Each strategy offers a different 
transformation function (Figure 2).  Strategy 1 (S1) yields the highest expected 
returns for those with asset stocks less than the T2 threshold level at which it becomes 
preferable to practice strategy 2 (S2), which has an entry barrier, a minimum asset 
stock of E2. Similarly, S2 is preferred up until the point T3 where strategy 3 (S3, 
characterized by entry barrier E3) begins to dominate, and beyond threshold T4, 
strategy 4 (S4) is preferred.  This is a very general framework that encompasses, for 
example, models of nonseparable consumption and production choice by households 
and multidimensional livelihood choice (DeJanvry et al. 1990, Baland and Platteau 
1994, Ellis 2000).  
Figure 2 reflects the role played by ex ante productive asset holdings in 
influencing strategy choice and resulting welfare outcomes.  The larger one’s stock of 
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assets ex ante – reflected in rightward movement along the x axis – the higher the 
returns one enjoys and the greater the likelihood that one chooses higher return 
strategies that, in the neighbourhood of the asset threshold at which the optimal 
strategy switches, generate increased marginal returns to assets.  The local increase in 
marginal returns attributable to changing strategies, in spite of assumed diminishing 
returns to assets within each strategy, can be seen if one draws a ray connecting the 
origin and the transformation curves for each strategy.  At the threshold points, such a 
ray increases in slope as decision-makers switch to the superior strategy.  Such locally 
increasing returns are the hallmark of poverty traps (Barrett 2003a).  
The slopes of the transformation functions depend on four key factors.  First, 
production, processing and distribution technologies determine how assets map into 
expected physical output of primary or processed products.  The more efficient and 
productive the technology, the steeper the slope of the transformation function since 
an extra unit of productive assets (e.g., an additional hectare of land) generates greater 
marginal output.  This reflects the familiar production function approach in 
microeconomics, wherein land, labor, capital and other inputs combine to generate 
outputs.   
Second, marketing arrangements and resulting (input and output) prices and 
transaction costs determine how physical output maps into expected money metric 
value.  As the prices of purchased inputs or the transactions costs of commerce fall or 
the prices of goods and services rise, the transformation curve pivots in the same 
counterclockwise fashion as when production technologies become more efficient.  At 
this level of generality, markets are analytically equivalent to technologies, where 
prices and transactions costs are the “production function” transforming things sold 
into things purchased.11  
Third, the riskiness of the technologies and markets, as well as the risk 
preferences of the decision-maker(s), determine how expected monetary yield maps 
into risk-adjusted welfare.  Increased variability in yield or prices or greater risk 
aversion flattens the transformation curve.  Fourth, for all scales of aggregation 
                                                 
11 This can be seen readily through a slightly more formal treatment.  Describe a general production 
technology mapping productive assets (e.g., a stock of arable land or working age population), X, into 
output, Y, as Y=f(X).  Now, let there be another technology mapping X into another output, Z: Z=g(X).  
A market provides a medium of converting Z into Y according to the relative price, PZ/PY, and fixed 
transactions costs, T: Y= (PZZ – T) /PY.  Of course, substitution implies Y= (PZ g(X) – T) /PY and 
f(X)= (PZ g(X) – T) /PY satisfies all the characteristics of a production function.   
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beyond the individual, the transformation function subsumes mechanisms for 
distributing aggregate net returns among units of the collective. 
The location of the transformation curves in Figure 2 – i.e., the points at which 
they cross the x axis, holding slope constant – depend on the unrecoverable (i.e., 
sunk) costs required to access each strategy.  The intercepts of the transformation 
functions along the Y-axis of Figure 2 (not shown) reflect the sunk costs to pursuing 
the strategy.  Together with the slope of the resulting curve, which reflects the returns 
to the strategy, these generate both the minimum viable asset stock necessary for 
remunerative entry (the points marked E2, E3, and E4) – the point at which there exist 
positive expected returns – and the threshold levels (the intersections of 
transformation curves at asset levels T2, T3, and T4) at which agents naturally switch 
strategies.  The greater the sunk cost, holding slope constant, the larger the minimum 
asset stock necessary to undertake the strategy.12   
The shape of each transformation curve and the thresholds at which it becomes 
desirable to switch from one strategy to another necessarily vary among individuals or 
households.  Some variation is individual- or household-specific.  For example, more 
risk averse people will generally opt for lower return-lower risk strategies than 
otherwise identical people with lower risk aversion. Some variation will occur over 
space and time, reflecting spatial variation in prices and intertemporal variation in 
exogenous production conditions.  This reflects the role of covariate factors on 
strategy choice and resulting welfare outcomes.  For example, if strategies 1 and 2 in 
Figure 2 involve rainfed farming and the others do not, then the first two curves will 
move up and down over time as rainfall becomes more or less favorable, respectively.  
Those of moderate wealth may move between those two strategies and into and out of 
strategy 3 accordingly.  Extending this example, if strategy 1 represents semi-
subsistence farming while strategy 2 represents commercialized farming for market, 
then E2 and T2 may be very low for those living quite near good roads and urban 
terminal markets, but quite high for those living in more remote places.   
As alluded to previously, the transformation curves reflect conditional 
expectations functions.  One can envision a distribution of possible realizations of 
welfare outcomes around each point on the curve, reflecting idiosyncratic risk faced 
                                                 
12 We intentionally avoid use of the term “scale” in referring to the stock of assets employed in a 
particular strategy or to the size of an operation (as implied by “economies of scale”).  Rather, we only 
use “scale” in its measure theoretic sense, reflecting the metric used in measurement, particularly the 
degree of aggregation implicit in a particular unit of analysis.   
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by individual units at the relevant scale of analysis.  Covariate shocks, by contrast, 
would be reflected in an unanticipated displacement of the transformation curve for 
all units uniformly affected by the shock.  Realized output or income depends on both 
covariate and idiosyncratic risk.   
 
b. The dynamic model 
Thus far we have a purely static conceptualization of welfare outcomes, 
although our objective is to understand poverty traps, the inherently dynamic 
mechanism underpinning persistent poverty.  As we now show, the static formulation 
of the preceding section lays the foundation for exploring the dynamics of asset 
accumulation and decumulation and thus of intertemporal welfare changes.  The 
dynamic framework also helps us to address one of the key dimensions of poverty – 
vulnerability of livelihoods to shocks beyond the control of the individual decision-
maker.   
The key to understanding the dynamic implications of the foregoing 
framework lies in recognizing that each strategy individually exhibits the usual 
diminishing returns properties.  Therefore, the well-known convergence implications 
of neoclassical growth theory apply within the domain of each strategy’s dominance.  
Within any single strategy, low initial asset stocks imply high marginal productivity, 
which induces investment in asset accumulation up to the point where one converges 
on a dynamic equilibrium, a point at which a stable asset stock is optimal, given 
intertemporal preferences between current and future consumption.  Conversely, if 
one begins a period above the dynamic equilibrium asset stock, one disinvests or 
decumulates assets back toward the equilibrium. An important implication is that 
asset and income growth are not inconsistent with the idea of a poverty trap, although 
growth rates and equilibrium asset or income levels are bounded from above in the 
presence of a poverty trap unless one switches strategies.  In the empirical 
macroeconomic literature on growth, this pattern is sometimes known as “club 
convergence” (Baumol 1986, Quah 1996), wherein clusters of units each converge on 
a small number of equilibria, but they do not all move toward a single steady state 
growth rate or income level. 
Different strategies therefore have different dynamic equilibria. Figure 3 
depicts this graphically.  The horizontal axis measures the productive asset stock in a 
particular period, just as in Figure 2, with the vertical axis now reflecting the 
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subsequent period’s asset stock.  The dashed, 45-degree line therefore reflects 
dynamic equilibria, points where the expected asset stock is constant across periods.  
The four recursion curves13 reflect the path dynamics of optimal asset holdings 
conditional on the strategy chosen.  Each recursion curve is associated with a different 
dynamic equilibrium, reflected on the vertical axis at A*1, A*2, A*3, and A*4 for the 
four stylized strategies, respectively.  These curves move in a fashion similar to those 
of Figure 2, moving up (down) as the underlying productivity of the asset stock – and 
thus discounted future returns to investment in the asset – increases (decreases) due to 
changes in market conditions, technologies or exogenous factors affecting a strategy’s 
expected future productivity.14   
The key to understanding the genesis of poverty traps lies in understanding the 
nature of transitions – or, more importantly, the absence of transitions – between 
strategies.15  Where two strategies’ recursion diagrams cross at an asset level below 
the dynamic equilibrium of the lower return strategy, decision makers will graduate 
endogenously from a lower return, transition strategy to the next higher return 
strategy until ultimately settling into the dynamic equilibrium of a stable strategy.  
Strategies are either stable or transition.   
The distinction arises because transition strategies such as Strategy 3 in Figure 
3 have domains of accumulation – ranges over which one expects to observe further 
asset accumulation while the agent remains within the strategy – but no domains of 
decumulation, as shown in the Figure’s bottom panel.  Hence the “transition” label.  
Transition strategies merely provide pathways from lower productivity strategies to 
higher productivity ones.  Rational agents would never intentionally reach a transition 
strategy’s dynamic equilibrium, much less overshoot it and divest assets back toward 
the equilbrium. The concave production technologies that underpin neoclassical 
growth theory can be understood as an infinite sequence of transition technologies 
leading to the unique strategy exhibiting an optimal dynamic equilibrium.     
                                                 
13 We refer to these as recursion curves or recursion diagrams because they reflect the recursivity of the 
asset, i.e., they depict how the first-order Markov process describing the asset’s law of motion varies 
with initial asset level. 
14 Life cycle effects may also shift these curves.  If younger households tend to put greater value on 
accumulating assets that will pay dividends for a longer period, then the accumulation trajectory will 
tend to rise as households mature to middle years, then begin falling again as their remaining life 
expectancy grows shorter.  Deaton (1992), however, finds life cycle savings relatively unimportant 
empirically in developing countries.  
15 The analytics of this choice among a family of individually concave strategies is developed formally 
in Barrett and Blume (2003).  
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The possibility of poverty traps therefore emerges when there exist lower 
productivity, stable strategies from which agents do not naturally graduate.  Consider  
strategies 1 and 2 in Figure 3.  Agents who start with asset holdings within the basin 
of attraction for each of these strategies follow an accumulation trajectory that leaves 
them at that same strategy’s dynamic equilibrium.  Those whose dynamic asset 
equilibrium leaves them below the poverty line – A*1 in Figure 3 – are chronically 
poor, as in the case of Strategy 1.  Those whose asset accumulation trajectory spans 
the poverty line will routinely move into and out of poverty depending upon 
temporary or permanent changes to underlying asset productivity and shocks to their 
asset holdings.  Those agents on the lower end of Strategy 2’s basin of attraction may 
be transitorily poor.  They are expected to grow out of poverty in time, but their 
accumulation trajectory spans the poverty line, leaving them vulnerable to temporary 
spells in poverty.  Those whose asset endowments, given extant technologies, markets 
and exogenous institutional and biophysical conditions, permit them to pursue 
strategies 3 and 4 are the non-poor.  Absent adverse shocks to their asset stock (e.g., 
due to permanently debilitating disease or injury, or theft or natural disaster that cause 
them to lose productive assets), they enjoy welfare and wealth accumulation that 
leaves them consistently above the poverty line.  
Financial market failures are essential to the possibility of a poverty trap 
associated with low productivity stable strategies.  If those with low asset stocks could 
borrow freely, they would do so in order to cross the thresholds and pursue Strategy 4, 
using the resulting productivity gains to repay the loan with interest.  The absence of 
such moves provides prima facie evidence of the unavailability of financial contracts 
on terms sufficient to enable mobility.  The same logic applies to those who suffer 
adverse asset shocks – e.g., disabling illness or injury, or loss of land, livestock or 
physical or financial capital – and haven’t access to insurance contracts to recoup 
their losses.  This financing constraint exists at all scales, from individuals and 
households unable to access credit because of insufficient collateral, to local 
governments unable to borrow on capital markets due to limited tax collection 
capacity, to national governments rationed out of global financial markets because of 
political risk or debt overhang.  Hence the fractal nature of poverty traps. 
This framework underscores the important distinction between income shocks 
– short-lived movements of or random draws around the transformation functions in 
Figure 2, as discussed in the previous section – and asset shocks, reflected in 
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movements along the x axis.  Exogenous asset shocks – for example, valuable farm 
land or livestock washed away in floods, or cattle or cash stolen – immediately affect 
one’s accumulation pattern.  If the shock leaves one within the domain of 
accumulation of the ex ante strategy, the increased marginal value of assets induces 
fresh investment in accumulation toward the strategy’s dynamic equilibrium.  One 
gradually reconstitutes one’s portfolio. But if the shock is severe enough to knock one 
down into the domain of a lower strategy, permanent change results, implying a new, 
lower dynamic equilibrium.  Income shocks can affect asset stocks in so far as 
subsistence constraints force those suffering income shocks to decumulate assets 
endogenously as a coping strategy, moving them leftward along the x axis, potentially 
threatening their ability to continue their ex ante strategy.  Hence the importance of 
safety nets to provide income transfers in response to income shocks.  State-
conditional transfers associated with safety nets can protect valuable productive 
assets, preventing endogenous asset decumulation off the equilibrium path depicted in 
Figure 3.   
The importance of asset shocks to welfare dynamics underscores not only the 
centrality of vulnerability to the conceptualization of poverty but also the importance 
of different livelihood or development strategies to vulnerability.  Some people, 
communities and nations systematically face greater objective exposure to adverse 
shocks.  For example, IFRCRCS (2002) reports that more than 98 percent of the 
people affected by different types of environmental (e.g., droughts, earthquakes, 
floods, avalanches) and technological (e.g., industrial or transport accidents) disasters 
worldwide, 1992-2001, lived in low and medium human development nations.  
Airline crashes in the United States and heat wave fatalities in France may capture the 
headlines, but the overwhelming majority of shocks are experienced in the developing 
world.  Beyond differences in objective risk exposure, identical biophysical or policy 
shocks can have markedly different dynamic welfare effects across strategies.  For 
example, drought may devastate sedentarized agropastoralists but have little effect on 
migratory herders within the same rangeland communities (Smith et al. 2001).  The 
end of state controls on commodity marketing and pricing may benefit producers in 
communities with good market access and have no effect on remote communities 
engaged in semi-subsistence production. In general, the emerging literature on 
vulnerability emphasizes cross-sectional differences in the ways in which nations, 
regions, communities and individuals respond to adverse shocks  (Christiaensen and 
 14
Boisvert 1999, Pritchett et al. 2000, Christiansen and Subbarao, 2001, Chaudhuri 
2001, Chaudhuri et al. 2002, Ligon and Schechter 2002).  Within the fractal poverty 
traps formulation, these differences appear to correspond closely to pursuit of 
strategies with higher-level equilibria, with units following superior strategies proving 
more likely to maintain valuable productive assets in the face of asset or income 
shocks, and, even if they have to change strategies, they are less likely to fall beyond 
the poverty line.  
Distinct classes, identifiable by the different strategies they pursue and the 
range of productivity levels they experience, thus emerge naturally from threshold 
effects created by the fixed or switching costs inherent to superior strategies and 
limited access to credit or insurance among the poor.  Past disadvantage and adverse 
shocks can persist, even after the original source(s) of shock or disadvantage (e.g., 
ethnic or racial discrimination, political patronage) have passed.  Conversely, positive 
asset shocks due to transfers or windfall gains or transitory policy interventions that 
increase the returns or reduce the entry costs to higher return strategies, even if only 
temporarily, can have permanent effects.  Hence the value of initial (but short-lived) 
subsidies to new technology adoption or to the creation of new organizations to 
address collective action problems, of educational loans and land reform, of safety 
nets to prevent asset decumulation in response to income shocks, etc. 
Short-term interventions will be successful, however, only if they affect the 
transformation functions, and thus the accumulation trajectories, of populations 
trapped in low productivity stable strategies.  General economic growth stimulus will 
tend to leave the chronically poor behind unless particular efforts are made to 
facilitate their transition to more remunerative livelihood strategies.  The challenge of 
reducing chronic poverty revolves around finding ways to remove or transcend the 
thresholds and financial constraints that limit accumulation and access to 
remunerative strategies.   
 
3. The fractal nature of poverty traps 
 
 This informal theory of poverty traps applies to any social or spatial unit that 
controls productive assets, uses them to generate outputs of value, and accumulates or 
decumulates them over time in response to shocks and shifting returns to asset 
building.  Most macroeconomists take the nation state as the unit of analysis and 
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attempt to explain the large persistent differences observed in economic growth and 
welfare across countries.  The data presented in Figure 1 and the broader empirical 
literature on chronic poverty demonstrate the relevance of the concept at the 
household scale as well.  The limited available empirical evidence also suggests 
persistent differences in poverty between types of individuals within households, 
between families in communities, between communities in regions, and between 
regions in countries.   
 We thus propose that poverty traps can best be conceived as multi-scalar, 
interlinked across scales of aggregation, and fractal.  They are multi-scalar in that 
significant and persistent differences in poverty appear at multiple scales from 
individual to national and beyond.  They are interlinked across scales in that 
phenomena at one scale have important spillover effects on higher and, especially, 
lower scales.  For example, low farm-level productivity in cultivation technologies 
may have community-scale origins in coordination failures due to social cleavages 
that result, for example, in failures to coordinate weed, water or pest control, or they 
may be rooted in the failure of national-scale agricultural research systems to develop 
and adapt new technologies or regional markets for distribution of mineral fertilizer, 
improved seed or other key variable inputs. Poverty traps are ultimately fractal in that 
the underlying patterns of thresholds, bounded patterns of accumulation and 
decumulation, and multiple dynamic equilibria are reproduced at all scales in 
strikingly similar patterns.     
Variation in outcomes and poverty dynamics within units at collective scales – 
from household up through multinational region – result primarily from (i) differences 
in initial asset holdings, which are often the product of past shocks, (ii) inter-unit 
differences in available production technologies, market prices and participation 
costs, and exogenous conditions (e.g., rainfall) that cause transformation functions to 
vary up and down across different units, (iii) the sunk costs to technology acquisition, 
market participation and institution building (e.g., financing costs) that move the 
transformation functions left and right for different units within the collective, and 
(iv) internal and external social organizational factors – e.g., likelihood of 
coordination, cooperation and conflict – that affect the transformation of endowments 
into products and the efficiency with which savings from one period can be translated 
into greater productive assets in subsequent periods.   
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Variation in outcomes between collective units commonly arise from 
organizational and institutional characteristics that create inter-scale linkages.  For 
example, communities within which households cooperate actively in the resolution 
of various coordination and externality problems tend to suffer less poverty and enjoy 
greater economic mobility as compared to communities plagued by ongoing collective 
action problems.  Nations subject to internal civil strife suffer higher poverty and 
lower growth than those that maintain political stability.  Regions in which firms work 
out effective vertical contracting arrangements tend to enjoy stronger employment 
growth and technological change than those in which volatile spot markets continue to 
mediate most transactions (Porter 1990, Fujitsa et al .1999).  Districts with good 
informational and marketing linkages to metropolitan centers – where through 
infrastructure or through social linkages such as those due to ethnic trader networks – 
commonly acquire new production and processing technologies sooner and grow 
faster than regions with poorer physical and social connections to other units. 
The remainder of this section therefore illustrates the applicability of the 
fractal poverty traps concept to macro, meso and micro scales of analysis.  One could 
structure this discussion from micro-to-macro, aggregating and endogenizing 
phenomena as the discussion proceeds.  We opt, however, to reverse the order, 
working from macro scale poverty traps down to the micro scale, steadily peeling 
away layers of between-units variation in poverty to focus on within-units variation as 
we work from the macro scale of nation states and multinational regions, through the 
meso scale of subnational jurisdictions, cultural and geographic communities, down to 
the micro scale of households and individuals.   
 
a. Macro scale 
At a certain level, the very existence of development studies as an area of research 
reflects the fractal nature of poverty traps at macro scale.  Whole regions of the globe 
– Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
North Africa, Central Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe – have been mired in 
widespread, acute poverty for prolonged periods of time.  The idea of macro scale 
poverty traps is perhaps most baldly reflected in the regional dummy variable 
phenomena common to much of the empirical growth literature in economics, 
wherein a dummy variable for “Africa”, “Latin America” or other such broad 
populations is included and commonly found to be associated with statistically 
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significantly negative effects on economic performance (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1995, Collier and Gunning 1999).   
A variety of explanations exist for broad geographic clustering of poverty in 
the world at the scale of nation states and groups of countries, turning largely on 
exogenous conditions.  Many of the classical development theories fit the fractal 
poverty traps model exceedingly well, as they arise from positive technological 
spillovers due to internal or external economies of scale. For example, Rosenstein-
Rodan’s (1943) theory of the "big push" emphasized the need for coordinated 
investment and expansion between industries in order to reach the critical minimum 
efficient scale of production necessary to emerge and sustain their growth.  Nurkse 
(1952) and Myrdal (1957) developed this further in their discussions of "circular 
causation" among industries.  They recognized the existence of positive pecuniary 
externalities associated with industrialization such that one industry's growth 
depended on the existence of a market for its products, a market most likely to 
develop in cities among the labor force of other industries. This creates fundamental 
interdependence among industries due to inherent coordination problems.  Failure to 
coordinate, these authors cautioned, would lead economies into a "low-level 
equilibrium trap."  Even Hirschman’s (1958) focus on backward (and to a lesser 
extent, forward) linkages between industries, although cast in contrast to Nurkse as an 
argument for “unbalanced” growth, likewise rested on the idea that investments in 
sectors with the strongest linkages would endogenously generate broad-based growth 
propagated through those linkages.  These "high development" theories emphasized 
strategic complementarity among sectors due to coordination effects and inherent 
nonconvexities due to positive externalities and increasing returns to scale 
technologies.16  
Some more contemporary explanations of macro scale poverty traps turn on 
the biophysical characteristics of regions, especially how humidity and temperature 
affect agriculture and health and how distance to ocean ports and the mass of global 
economic activity affect trade (Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997, Gallup and Sachs 1998, 
Bloom and Sachs 1998). Other explanations turn on history-dependent social 
phenomena, whether the ethnic divisions that permeate countries and regions 
(Easterly and Levine 1997, Collier and Gunning 1999), histories of political violence 
                                                 
16 For a modern, formal development of the classical models, see Murphy et al. (1989). 
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(Barro 1990, Easterly and Levine 1997, Collier and Gunning 1999), the complex 
effects of subjugation by different colonial powers on internal and external 
organization (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002), the historical accidents of urbanization 
(Fujita et al. 1999), or wealthy country policies that distort global market prices, such 
as European Union and United States beef, cotton and sugar producer subsidies that 
substantially lower the terms of trade African and Caribbean exporters earn from 
these products. 
Each of these explanations fits the theoretical framework developed in the 
preceding section.  All involve exogenous factors that affect asset accumulation and 
the development strategies chosen by governments.  Some explanations turn on lower 
returns to specific strategies (e.g., agriculture or manual labor in hot and diseased 
settings) in particular world regions as compared to others, effectively shifting down 
the transformation curves in Figure 2, as well as their associated accumulation paths 
in Figure 3, potentially generating poverty traps. Other effects add to nations’ or 
regions’ fixed costs of accessing state-of-the-art technologies or high value-added 
markets, shifting higher strategies’ transformation curves rightward and again 
potentially leading lower level strategies to become stable rather than transition 
strategies.  
 
b. Meso scale 
A rapidly growing body of literature points to the existence of poverty traps at 
scales that are intermediate between household and nation.  Many studies have found 
evidence of significant and sustained income disparities between regions and 
administrative areas within countries, between villages within larger administrative 
areas or regions, and between population cohorts that cut across geographic units.  In 
this paper we group all of those phenomena under the heading of meso scale poverty 
traps.   
Economic geographers have long noted the existence of geographic pockets 
where poverty is particularly deep and persistent.  Areas noted in the economics 
literature include the north and west of China (Jalan and Ravallion 2002), northern 
Uganda (Okidi and Mugambe, 2002), the “poverty square” in the east and central 
region of India, northeast Thailand, isolated areas of the Himalayas (Bird et al., 2003; 
Prakash, 1997), and more remote areas of Madagascar (Stifel et al. 2003).  Advances 
in the collection and analysis of spatial economic data has increased the possibility of 
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using objective and measurable criteria to target development assistance to particular 
areas of acute need.  Poverty mapping studies have recently been completed or are 
underway across the developing world under the World Bank’s leadership.17  
A parallel body of research has emerged around efforts to establish the 
determinants of spatial inequality within nations.18  That research suggests that 
poverty is particularly prevalent and persistent in “less favored lands” that are far 
removed from market and political centers, experience persistent conflicts, and attract 
low levels of government investment and services.  The core of this argument is that 
these areas have been less favored by both nature, in the form of lower and more 
erratic rainfall and poorer soils, and people, through infrastructural and institutional 
deficiencies and high levels of market price volatility and political disturbance.  Poor 
communications and transport infrastructure so inflate the costs of market 
participation that households rationally opt out of commercial agriculture and settle 
for low-return semi-subsistence production with few improved, purchased inputs 
(Omamo 1998a, 1998b).  Spatial patterns of grain storage lead to greater intra-annual 
price variability in rural areas, with adverse welfare consequences for the rural poor, 
especially those who are seasonal net food buyers (Barrett 1996).  National policies 
routinely impose costs on poorer regions for the benefit of other, richer regions, such 
as quarantine-based methods of animal disease control in Kenya (Barrett et al. 2003), 
taxation and general public services provision (Bates 1993), and agricultural pricing 
and distribution policies (Lipton 1977).  Fafchamps and Moser (2002), studying 
commune scale data from Madagascar, find that more remote rural communities 
systematically suffer higher rates of violent crime and property crime per capita, all 
else equal, because governments largely ignore rural areas, leading to a certain level 
of lawlessness and underprovision of police protection services relative to need. Smith 
et al. (2001) find that inter-district differences in agroecological conditions, physical 
and social services endowment and recent experience of health (especially HIV-
AIDS) shocks have considerable power in explaining differences in the patterns of 
livelihoods pursued and the welfare trajectories of peoples in rural Uganda. 
                                                 
17  See Elbers et al. (2001 and 2002) for an explanation of the small area estimation technique that 
underpins contemporary poverty mapping.   
18 See especially the papers presented at a series of conferences organized by Ravi Kanbur, Tony 
Venables and various collaborators under the auspices of the United Nations University’s World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) Project on Spatial Disparities in Human 
Development (http://people.cornell.edu/pages/sk145/links.htm or http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/).  
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A smaller number of studies have focused on the magnitude and determinants 
of differences in poverty between communities within particular geographic areas.  
Krishna (2002) has studied differences in welfare between villages in the Indian state 
of Rajastan and found internal social cohesion and the strength of linkages to external 
sources of power and finance to be the most important determinants of village 
development performance.  Dercon (2002) used panel household data from Ethiopia 
to assess the determinants of inter-village differences in the dynamics of poverty, 
finding that inter-village differences were related to initial differences in key assets: 
the size of land holdings, educational achievement, and road infrastructure.  In an 
analysis of household data from 808 non-pastoralist communities in Kenya that were 
surveyed in 1994 and again in 1997, Christiaensen and Subbarao (2001) found  
income diversification, market access, adult literacy, and access to electricity reduced 
vulnerability, while the incidence of malaria increased vulnerability.     
Some sub-populations that stretch across geographic areas also experience 
significantly higher levels of poverty than the general population.  This includes 
ethnic minorities such as the African American population in the United States or 
indigenous upland ethnic groups in southeast Asia.  Bias against the hill tribes of 
Thailand is strong and formalized; many millions of people aredenied citizenship and 
officials hold them responsible for many of the country’s problems.  Levels of welfare 
and economic development are much lower than for lowland Thai living nearby.  
Such differences may stem from systematic biases in the provision of public services, 
lower access to labour markets, and / or insecure property rights.  Such market 
failures and social rigidities may induce adaptations of local organizations that help in 
some respect, but also create other problems (Hoff et al. 1993).  For example, social 
networks that provide for mutual insurance in the absence of effective financial 
markets can create obstacles to the adoption of new technologies (Hogset 2002, 
Moser and Barrett 2002), to expanding employment in small businesses (Fafchamps 
and Minten 2002), and to investment in business enterprises (Platteau 2000).  Social 
networks and group identity have multiple effects, some of which can foster asset 
accumulation and welfare improvements, others of which retard economic advance in 
poor communities, leading to precisely the sort of multiple equilibria that underpin 
poverty traps (Durlauf 2001, Barrett 2002a, 2003b).  
 The theory of fractal poverty traps fits these meso-scale patterns well.  At the 
meso-scale, the relevant assets tend to be those held by collectives or public sector 
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institutions.  Groups that can cooperate and coordinate effectively between units are 
better able to produce public goods (e.g., roads, water management infrastructure, 
schools, health clinics) and services (e.g., security, reliable communications, 
sanitation) that crowd in private investment, leading to higher tax revenues and 
ultimately higher level equilibria.  High rates of public investment typically 
accompany high private investment, and low public with low private, in cycles of 
mutual causation.  Evidence of this mutual causation between public and private 
investment is provided, for example, by Escobal et al. (2000) for the case of Peru.      
At meso scales of analysis, coordination, cooperation and conflict are 
especially important determinants of asset accumulation, the transformation of assets 
into goods and services of value, and distribution of those goods and services among 
units within the aggregate.  Thus the institutional arrangements that shape interactions 
among units and between scales weigh especially heavily in establishing the 
equilibrium into which an economy settles.  In game theoretic terms, a coordination 
problem exists when the returns to an activity increase as others undertake the same 
activity, with multiple equilibria emerging naturally.  A low-level equilibrium might 
involve, for example, disrespect for individual property rights, which may be 
individually optimal behavior conditional on everyone else not honoring property 
rights, but collectively irrational in that everyone could be made better off if property 
rights were made secure and honored costlessly by all parties.  Similarly, cooperative 
equilibria lead to high-level equilibria, while noncooperative equilibria tend to lead to 
lower-level equilibria  (e.g., cooperative equilibria are Pareto efficient while 
noncooperative ones are not).   
Institutional arrangements that foster greater cooperation within aggregates of 
individuals, like those that promote communication and coordination, thereby tend to 
lead to dynamic equilibria that are less likely to be associated with a poverty trap.  
Institutional arrangements that coordinate behavior within and between scales are also 
directly associated with another key dimension of poverty, the ability of individuals or 
groups to exert influence over phenomena that directly or indirectly affect their lives – 
in other words, the degree of voicelessness they suffer.  The performance of meso-
scale institutions may be judged on the basis of their responsiveness to the needs of all 
of their members, their ability to mobilize resources from internal and external 
(sometimes higher scale) sources, and the efficiency with which they transform assets 
into goods and services of value to their members.    
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The accumulation of physical assets can occur in any of at least four ways.  
First, individuals and households in an area may mobilize resources, through 
voluntary contributions or taxes, to obtain additional assets for use by a public 
agency.  Consider, for example, a group that raises funds for the construction of a 
clinic in the local area.  In that case, resources move from the micro to the meso scale.  
Second, a public agency can accumulate assets by reinvesting profits obtained from 
selling their services.  For example, a clinic may levy a surcharge on its services to 
build up an investment account for expansion.  Third, a public agency may be 
allocated funds from a local government that taxes citizens or economic activity in 
their area of jurisdiction..  For example, local governments may levy taxes on sales or 
property or sell concessions to forest resources (essentially converting one type of 
asset into another).  In such cases, resources are mobilized from within the meso 
scale.     Fourth, the public agency or organization may implement programmes on 
behalf of, or with support from more aggregate scales of government or from external 
sources such as development agencies or non-governmental organizations, 
establishing a macro-to-meso link.  Regardless of the accumulation mechanism, 
however, non-linearities in coordination, transaction or agency costs may generate 
thresholds in asset accumulation.  Shifting from one strategy to another may be 
associated with a shift in the mechanisms of asset accumulation.   
Besides mobilizing investment in physical assets, meso-scale groups may also 
augment private returns by regulating the use of collective natural resources, such as 
forests, rangelands and waterways.  The theories of open access and common 
property, which date back to Gordon (1954), stress the importance of meso-scale 
coordination of micro-scale decision making in order for resource use to be efficient.  
Both theoretical and empirical studies of natural resource management from around 
the developing world stress the tradeoffs between the effectiveness of the governance 
structures that make and enforce rules and the associated transaction costs (Ostrom 
1990, Baland and Platteau 1996).  One example of a threshold effect would arise from 
the sunk transaction costs of hiring forest guards to enforce rules on extraction of 
products from a community forestry. Communities that can afford to make the sunk 
investment in hiring and equipping guards can achieve a higher-level equilibrium 
based on effective rules enforcement than can otherwise identical communities unable 
to make such investments. 
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At meso scales, it is clear that asset thresholds have economic, collective 
action and political dimensions that are inter-related.  Many public goods and services 
exhibit increasing returns to scale and scope at subnational level.19  Equally, the 
demand for public services depends upon the structure and efficiency of markets for 
substitute services.  For example, the lack of private insurance or credit markets 
increases people’s willingness to participate in collective risk pooling and the 
potential benefits of public sector options for credit or risk buffering.         
The political dimension of asset accumulation thresholds refers to the 
governance of meso scale government agencies and organizations.  Since the 1980s 
there has been a strong trend toward decentralized provision of public services and 
devolved authority for natural resource management.20  Governments in developing 
countries have implemented decentralization and devolution to various extents, so that 
countries such as Mali, Bolivia, Uganda and the Philippines now have fairly 
autonomous local governments that exercise significant responsibility for providing 
services to local residents.  The performance of these local agencies is decidedly 
mixed.  On the positive side, Dreze and Sen (1995 referenced in Prakash 1997) 
hypothesize that differences in the degree of decentralization of political power 
influenced variation in poverty prevalence in the Indian Himalayas.  Himachel 
Pradesh had decentralization and high success in reducing infant mortality, while Utar 
Pradesh has been overly centralized and has failed to reduce infant mortality.  On the 
other hand, reports from supposed success stories such as Uganda find local 
governments plagued by technical inefficiency and corruption.  Bardhan (2002) 
argues that the relative performance of centralized versus decentralized administrative 
arrangements ultimately depends upon the extent to which they are captured by elites.  
Andersson (2002) shows that decentralization in Bolivia has been associated with 
                                                 
19 Economies of scope relate to the variety of goods and services provided, while economies of scale 
relate to the volume of any single good or service provided.  In both cases, per unit costs decrease over 
some range of output due to fixed costs of provision and complementarities in provision.  
20  The impetus for decentralization comes from several directions:  external push, democratization, 
competition among government agencies, and internal financial crisis (Knox and Meinzen-Dick, 2001).  
Multilateral organizations and multinational NGOs have pushed for decentralization because of their 
perception that more local agencies are more accountable to local residents and less prone to corruption 
and capture by elites.  At least three United Nations agencies – the World Bank, the UN Development 
Programme, and the UN Capital Development Fund – now have explicit programmes for supporting 
decentralization.  Democratic changes have hastened decentralization in some countries, for example in 
the Philippines and Indonesia.  However, Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) emphasize that decentralization 
is most often motivated by financial exigencies and competition among government agencies. Over-
stretched central governments see decentralization as a face-saving way of conserving funds and local 
offices see it as a way of gaining power.   
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large variation in the way that municipal governments have implementation forestry 
laws, with variation caused by differences in values, incentives and degree of 
accountability.  
Meso scale phenomena are not restricted to institutions of collective action.   Of 
particular importance, markets are socially constructed institutions.  Once one gets to 
aggregate scales of communities and regions, the terms on which individuals can buy 
or sell goods and services – terms that are effectively exogenous at the individual or 
household scale – begin to turn in part on how communities of households organize 
themselves.  Producer organizations such as cooperatives and periodic markets 
organized by local jurisdictions, as well as local contracting conventions, physical 
security and road and marketing infrastructure maintenance all have a pronounced 
effect on market conditions.  The Asian experience underscores the importance of the 
emergence of a rich set of agricultural producer organizations to facilitate bulk 
purchases of inputs and sales of outputs, access to extension services and political 
voice.  Some organizations have been set up by government, some by private firms 
and some have emerged spontaneously from within communities.  We understand 
relatively little about how efficacy varies with group origins, but we do know that 
some marketing organizations can prove extremely effective in achieving economies 
of scale or scope, in securing access to higher-return markets, and in stabilizing input 
and output prices faced by even small producers (World Bank 2003).    
c. Micro scale 
While the macroeconomic and meso scale evidence point to poverty traps, 
evidence at these aggregate scales fails to explain the extraordinary amount of poverty 
that exists within even relatively affluent communities.  Jayne et al. (2003) present 
evidence from extensive household surveys in five African countries (Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia) showing that income poverty among 
smallholder households is not primarily a geographic phenomenon.  They argue that 
most variation in household incomes is attributable to within-village differences rather 
than between-village differences, emphasizing in particular the meagre land 
endowments of most of the rural poor in Africa.  
The essence of dynamic poverty traps at micro scale is that households and 
individuals remain in chronic poverty because they are unable to self-finance 
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investments needed to generate high returns because of the lumpy nature of or the risk 
inherent to those investments and because they are unable to obtain external finance 
because of weak credit and insurance markets.   This manifests itself in discrete 
strategies exhibiting markedly different welfare distributions, where the ex ante poor 
choose strategies offering less attractive stochastic returns than the ex ante rich 
choose, simply because the more attractive strategies lie beyond their means. 
For example, Figure 4 (adapted from Barrett et al. 2001a) depicts the 
cumulative frequency distributions of total income among 1079 households in 
Rwanda, organized into four distinct livelihood strategies.  The farm and farm worker 
(FFW) strategy includes households that only work as unskilled agricultural laborers 
or farm their own land.  The full-time farmer (FTF) strategy represents households 
that farmed their own land and livestock and had no off-farm employment.  The 
mixed strategy includes non-farm employment with farming and unskilled 
agricultural labor.  Finally, the mixed-skilled only (MSO) strategy involves only 
farming or skilled non-farm labor for a salary or as an entrepreneur.  As displayed in 
Figure 4, full time farming (FTF) and especially farm and farm worker (FFW) 
livelihood strategies are stochastically dominated by mixed strategies, especially those 
involving only skilled labor and farming (MSO).  No one would choose the FFW 
strategy if they had access to the Mixed or MSO strategies.  Barriers to entry into 
higher return strategies become evident by revealed preference.  
Such welfare orderings among distinct strategies appear strongly related to 
barriers to entry that impede access to more remunerative livelihoods by those lacking 
the necessary financial, human or natural capital to undertake these activities (Dercon 
and Krishnan 1996, Ellis 2000, Barrett, Reardon and Webb 2001).  In the Rwandan 
example, full-time farming is only an option for those endowed with enough land or 
livestock to absorb all the adult labor in the household.  Skilled non-farm employment 
is only available to those with education, particular skills (e.g., blacksmiths, lorry 
drivers), or the necessary financial capital to start a business. 
As a consequence, a growing mass of empirical evidence underscores the 
importance of initial asset holdings in determining households’ income growth and 
the likelihood of exit from poverty.  For example, Ravallion and Datt (2002) find that 
the elasticity of the poverty rate to non-farm output depended significantly on the 
initial percentage of landlessness among households in India.  Barrett et al. (2001b) 
similarly found that among rice farming households in Côte d’Ivoire, households with 
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poor initial asset endowments were unable to access superior livelihood strategies that 
bestowed considerable income gains following the massive CFA franc exchange rate 
devaluation of January 1994.  Those with poor endowments were less able to respond 
to attractive emerging on-farm and non-farm opportunities, while the ex ante rich 
reaped considerable gains from devaluation that was promoted as benefiting small 
farmers.  Dercon (1998) likewise finds that initial assets condition Tanzanian agro-
pastoralists’ ability to accumulate wealth and move out of poverty.  Simply put, initial 
conditions matter. 
As suggested by the Rwandan example illustrated in Figure 4, those with little 
or no assets are far less likely to acquire scarce skills or capital necessary to enter into 
remunerative nonfarm activities that lead to higher income and consumption (Dercon 
and Krishnan 1996, Barrett, Reardon and Webb 2001).  In Ethiopia, pastoralists 
whose livestock herds fall below a threshold of 12-15 head of cattle tend to become 
involuntarily sedentarized because of a minimum necessary scale for transhumant 
migration.  As a consequence, multiple equilibria emerge, with traditional pastoralists 
able to sustain large, mobile herds while others languish with one or two animals, 
trapped in grim rangeland towns with few employment prospects (Lybbert et al. 
2002). Patterns of fallow, commodity production and land holding dynamics in the 
Peruvian Amazon similarly depend heavily on ex ante land and labor endowments 
(Coomes and Burt 1997, Coomes et al. 2000).   
Households caught on the wrong end of such traps often end up in a pattern of 
persistent poverty and steady degradation of the natural resource base on which they 
depend (Shepherd and Soule 1998, Coomes and Burt 1997, Coomes et al. 2000, 
Barrett et al., 2002b).  Sufficient conditions for the existence of dynamic poverty traps 
at the household scale are that they have incomplete access to financial services 
(credit or insurance) along with (i) high return production or marketing strategies 
exhibit a minimum efficient scale of production that is beyond the means of the 
credit-constrained poor (Barrett and Blume 2003); or (ii) risk and subsistence 
constraints discourage long-term investment in high-return assets among poorer, more 
credit-constrained households (Zimmerman and Carter 2003).  
The most extreme cases of micro scale poverty traps involve essentially 
irreversible human capital accumulation failures due to childhood undernutrition, 
illness and lack of education.  Perhaps the most compelling models of poverty traps 
emerge at this micro scale, where undernutrition and morbidity early in life can lead 
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to permanent reductions in physical stature and health status associated with sharply 
increased risk of involuntary employment and lower incomes in adulthood (Dasgupta 
1993, 1997, Strauss and Thomas 1998), and where household-scale financial 
constraints can cause underinvestment in the education of children – even those with 
manifestly high  natural ability – thereby propagating poverty across generations 
(Loury 1981). 
 
4. Implications for Finding Pathways Out of Chronic Poverty 
We opened this paper by emphasizing the need for strategic focus and the 
imperative of igniting sustained growth among the poor if poverty reduction 
objectives, such as those reflected in the Millenium Development Goals, are to be 
achieved. The model of fractal poverty traps introduced and illustrated in the 
preceding sections highlights the multi-scalar nature of the problem and the centrality 
of threshold effects and coordination problems to chronic poverty as it appears at all 
scales of analysis.  So what are the key implications of fractal poverty traps for policy 
and research? How can the fractal poverty traps concept provide an analytical 
foundation to make pathways out of poverty accessible to the 1.2 billion people 
presently suffering extreme poverty?   
Five interrelated strategic emphases emerge directly from the fractal poverty 
traps formulation  First, it is possible that short-term transfers to individuals, 
households, communities, and nations caught in low-level equilibria can enable them 
to approach and cross crucial thresholds presently inaccessible to them and thereby to 
alight on endogenously sustainable accumulation trajectories that can carry them out 
of chronic poverty.  Threshold effects and poverty traps imply a potentially large role 
for transitory policy interventions to enable people to overcome constraints that keep 
them from reaching the nearest relevant threshold and subsequently embarking on an 
endogenous growth path to a higher equilibrium.  In Asia, short-term state investment 
in rural roads, electrification, water, marketing systems for improved seeds and 
inorganic fertilizers, in institutions to support small industry and services, etc. ignited 
private investment.  The possibility of “crowding in” investments reflects the 
possibility of higher level equilibrium.  These policies do not have to be fiscally 
sustainable in the long-run since the crucial positive effects come in the short-term.  
Such interventions nonetheless do need explicit sunset provisions so as to ensure that 
they do not become permanent drains on scarce fiscal resources.   
 28
Second, governments and donors need to work for the creation and extension 
of transition strategies that are accessible to the chronically poor and that can lead to 
accumulation that will carry them past thresholds and into other strategies with still-
better equilibria.  In Kenya, for example, the most successful transition strategies at 
the micro scale are small-scale irrigation of vegetables or tree seedlings using small-
scale water management technologies such as treadle pumps and water harvesting 
structures and smallholder tea produced under outgrower arrangements.  In 
Madagascar, we have observed that low-cost initial promotion of off-season 
cultivation of barley or potatoes induces increased uptake of modern rice varieties, 
mineral fertilizer and improved cultivation practices, yielding sustainable increases in 
yields and small farmer welfare. 
Third, public agencies need to assess the possibilities for eliminating or 
moving thresholds through interventions at aggregate scales that make previously 
inaccessible strategies feasible at more disaggregated scales, thereby inducing 
individual behavioural change by individuals, households or communities that leads 
to endogenous growth and exit from chronic poverty.  Examples include investments 
in potable water and small-scale irrigation structures that reduce both time lost to 
illness and to drawing and transporting water as well as variability in crop yields, 
sustainable microfinance institutions that increase access to credit and insurance, 
producer groups that reduce unit costs for purchased inputs and increase unit revenues 
for product sales, and transport infrastructure improvements to reduce the costs of 
market participation.   
Fourth, there is a critical need for effective safety nets set just above critical 
thresholds so as to prevent people from falling unexpectedly into chronic poverty.  
Especially where adverse asset shocks due to manmade or natural disasters are 
commonplace, safety nets to insure consumption and to prevent coping through asset 
decumulation can be valuable instruments for ensuring subsequent recovery with 
minimal need for further assistance.  This can induce endogenous improvement in 
productivity and income growth as poor people choose asset portfolios and activity 
patterns with greater expected returns that also exhibit greater uninsured risk in the 
absence of safety nets.21  
                                                 
21 The importance of safety nets also implies a need for researchers to identify reasonably precisely the 
thresholds that define poverty traps: which assets are crucial? And what are the critical levels that 
induce endogenous change in strategies?  Vulnerability analysis needs to begin to move away from 
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Perhaps the most essential safety nets are those that protect human health and 
education, keeping children adequately nourished and in school regardless of what is 
happening to their family’s income and insuring that adult workers enjoy sufficient, 
balanced nutrient intake to maintain physical productivity during temporary 
downturns in order that transitory shocks do not have permanent adverse 
consequences.  Safety nets to prevent the non-poor from falling into poverty in 
response to uninsured shocks are a fundamental component of any sensible poverty 
reduction strategy.  Otherwise, it is rather like draining the bathtub with the spigot still 
on.  As soon as some leave the basin of poverty, others enter, thereby maintaining the 
overall level and at great cost. 
Finally, fractal poverty traps carry important implications for decentralization.  
Following the principle of scale-sensitive subsidiarity, it typically makes sense to 
devolve authority over a resource or issue area to the lowest possible scale within 
which the associated externalities can be fully internalized and at which provision of 
the good or service can be done efficiently (i.e., realizing available economies of scale 
or scope).  The scale-sensitivity criterion to the subsidiarity principle is too often lost 
in contemporary discussions of public services provision, resource conservation 
design, and related arenas in which the principle of subsidiarity is commonly invoked.  
The default position appears to have become decentralization, although this may not 
always be appropriate. Applied researchers and policymakers need to identify the 
scale(s) at which (i) market and coordination failures are most limiting and it appears 
feasible and cost-effective to provide temporary assistance to surmount thresholds, (ii) 
spillover effects that will shift thresholds at lower scales, indirectly igniting 
accumulation and opening up pathways out of poverty for some presently trapped. 
Toward that end, prioritization exercises must take place at multiple scales and there 
must be serious attempts to integrate these, not just cursory exercises as has too often 
been the case in recent PRSP processes (Swallow 2003).   
Because many key factors behind persistent rural poverty – for example, water 
and health care availability, soil fertility degradation – are the result of a multi-scalar 
process involving policies at multiple scales of government and linkages among those 
scales, some povetry traps originate at multiple scales simultaneously.  For example, 
soil fertility degradation – one of the most pressing problems confronting much of 
                                                                                                                                            
measures relative to arbitrary poverty lines and toward establishing which units face the greatest risk of 
falling below such thresholds. 
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rural east Africa – has its origins in individual and household scale phenomena 
associated with meager land holdings and liquidity constraints to the purchase of 
mineral fertilizer or livestock, in community scale phenomena associated with tenurial 
regimes that limit investment incentives and impede effective organization of 
producer marketing groups to improve smallholders’ terms of trade, in regional scale 
thresholds associated with transport infrastructure and fertilizer distribution, and in 
national and multinational scale traps related to fertilizer production capacity and 
agricultural and natural resources management research.  Overcoming soil fertility 
problems – or other limiting factors with multi-scalar etiology – requires some 
combination of public action (e.g., a revolving fund for fertilizer), collective action 
(e.g., multi-purpose commodity clubs that can tax on delivery), and private action 
(e.g., investment in fertilizers or integrated crop-livestock systems). This necessarily 
requires multi-scalar approaches to develop, adapt and apply improved transition 
strategies so as to facilitate asset accumulation and productivity growth among the 
chronically poor and thereby enable them to escape the fractal poverty traps that 
appear to ensnare so many today.   
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